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STRATEGIC BINARY CHOICE MODELS WITH
PARTIAL OBSERVABILITY
Mark David Nieman
Iowa State University
Abstract: Strategic interactions among rational, self-interested actors are commonly
theorized in the behavioral, economic, and social sciences. The theorized strategic
processes have traditionally been modeled with multi-stage structural estimators,
which improve parameter estimates at one stage by using the information from
other stages. Multi-stage approaches, however, impose rather strict demands on
data availability: data must be available for the actions of each strategic actor at
every stage of the interaction. Observational data are not always structured in a
manner that is conducive to these approaches. Moreover, the theorized strategic
process implies that these data are missing not at random. In this paper, I derive
a strategic logistic regression model with partial observability that probabilistically
estimates unobserved actor choices related to earlier stages of strategic interactions.
I compare the estimator to traditional logit and split-population logit estimators
using Monte Carlo simulations and a substantive example of the strategic firm–
regulator interaction associated with pollution and environmental sanctions.
Key words and phrases: Data missing not at random, partial observability, strategic
choice models.
1. Introduction
Strategic interactions among rational, self-interested actors are of interest
in the behavioral, economic, and social sciences. Commonly one assumes that
each actor anticipates the expected action of other actors in order to choose its
own best response. An important empirical implication of strategic interactions
is that observable data are missing not at random (MNAR) (Signorino (1999,
2003); Signorino and Yilmaz (2003); Nieman (2015)). Consider, for example, the
modeling of a defender’s ability to deter an attack on a prote´ge´ (Schelling (1960);
Zagare and Kilgour (2000)). Successful deterrence is one possible outcome of a
strategic interaction between the defender and the attacker. The likelihood that
an attacker invades the prote´ge´ is determined, in part, by whether it expects the
defender to intervene. Strategic models are a common approach for statistically
modeling these type of interactions.
Strategic models provide a statistical theory of normal and extensive form
non-cooperative games (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1996, 1998)). The model
assumes that actors choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and that
other actors do as well. Strategic models build on random utility assumptions
(e.g., McFadden (1974, 1976)), where an error term represents that (1) actor i fol-
lows a “bounded rationality” logic, in that, while generally correct, it sometimes
errs when implementing its own actions or misperceives the other actor’s utility,
or (2) actor i has private information (Signorino (1999, 2003)). Each approach
is consistent with perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), a Nash-based equilibira
concept common in rational choice models (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998)).
Strategic models identify equilibria probabilities for actor actions at each
information set in a game. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1996, 1998) originally
developed the approach to explain variation in subject responses in experimental
settings. Signorino (1999) extended this to estimate coefficient parameters rather
than the variance. In either case, covariates are specified at each information set,
and the predicted probabilities from later stages are used to inform and condition
estimates at earlier stages to account for the theorized strategic process. This
process is similar to some imputation based approaches (e.g., Boehmke (2003);
Liu et al. (2013)) which use the estimates from one equation to construct la-
tent measures for censored cases. Strategic models differ from both traditional
nonignorable selection models (e.g., Heckman (1979); Sartori (2003)) and auxil-
iary/imputation based approaches in that strategic models are designed for sit-
uations in which two or more actors are in a non-cooperative setting. Strategic
models treat an actor’s choice in an earlier stage of the interaction as a function
of both its own expected behavior and the expected behavior of the other actor
in a later stage.
A drawback to this approach is that strategic models require data be avail-
able for each actor at each information set of the game (Signorino and Yilmaz
(2003, pp.556–557); Nieman (2015)), but observational data often fail to meet
this condition. Instead, data are often available only for the outcome of an in-
teraction, with little or no data on the individual actor actions that lead to the
observed outcome. This means that observational data are only partially ob-
served, since they are the result of unobserved joint decisions of multiple actors,
rather than those of a single decision-maker (Poirier (1980)). Moreover, the theo-
rized strategic process implies that data reflecting the unobserved joint decisions
are characterized by non-random missingness.
Figure 1 presents an example of the theoretical interaction between a firm and
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Figure 1. Interaction between firm and the environmental protection agency.
the environmental protection agency (EPA). Assume that the firm is interested
in maximizing its profits for producing widgets, but in the course of doing so
generates waste. The firm is presented with two choices: it can either stay within
its regulated guidelines of waste production (¬P ), or it can exceed regulations
and pollute illegally (P ). If the firm chooses ¬P , then the game ends with the
outcome No Pollution. If the firm chooses P , then the EPA will either detect
the violation and issue a sanction (S), resulting in the outcome Sanction, or
fail to detect the violation and not sanction (¬S), leading to the outcome Not
Detected. Observational data, however, contains only information on whether the
interaction resulted in a sanction, but not the individual actions. The number in
parentheses indicates how observational data would code each outcome.
Observational data combines two of the outcomes—No Pollution and Not
Detected—and treats them as non-events (0s), while treating the other outcome—
Sanction—as the observed event (1s). It is unlikely that unsanctioned, noncom-
pliant firms are randomly distributed; rather, firms may intentionally exceed pol-
lution standards when they believe that the EPA is less likely to sanction them,
meaning data for a firm’s actions are MNAR. Moreover, additional data collec-
tion would not resolve the nonrandom missingness problem: firms that pollute
and evade EPA sanctions are unlikely to volunteer accurate information regard-
ing their noncompliance with EPA standards. Ignoring the underlying strategic
process and simply treating the data as binary when estimating predictors of
noncompliance may lead to incorrect inferences regarding whether decreases in
the number of sanctions indicates that noncompliance is decreasing or whether
firms are increasingly evading detection.
In remainder of the paper, I derive a statistical solution to the theoretical
puzzles driven by the limitations in many datasets by extending the strategic
model to cases of partial observation. The estimator outperforms both tradi-
tional and binary choice mixture models in a set of Monte Carlo simulations.
Finally, I apply the estimator to the firm-level data regarding compliance with
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Figure 2. Strategic interaction with agent error.
environmental regulations from Konisky and Teodoro (2015).
2. A Strategic Model with Agent Error
A strategic discrete choice model where errors enter at information sets—
agent error—is depicted in Figure 2. The game has two actors, [A, B], four
actions [L, R, `, r], and three possible outcomes, [Y1, Y2, or Y3]. The actors
move sequentially, with A moving first. If actor A chooses L, the game ends with
Y1. If actor A chooses R, then actor B selects between ` and r. If actor B chooses
`, the game ends with Y2. If actor B chooses r, the game ends with Y3.
The utilities displayed under the terminal node reflect the actions of each
actor, so that U∗ij = Uij +αij , where U
∗
ij is the true utility, i is the actor, j is the
action, U is the observable utility (that is known by both actors and the analyst),
α represents agent error associated with the action, and the value in parentheses
is the outcome. Actor i knows the value of α, but actor ¬i (and the analyst) only
know its distribution. Each actor chooses the action where U∗ij > U
∗
i¬j . Since
the model is sequential, actor A must take into account the expected action of
actor B in order to maximize its own utility. Thus, the game is solved by working
backwards up the game tree.
If actor A chooses R, then actor B’s utilities for selecting ` and r are
U∗BR` = UB` + αB` , (2.1)
U∗BRr = UBr + αBr . (2.2)
Since the analyst and actor ¬i know only the distribution of αij , they only
have probabilistic estimates of i’s choice. If we assume that αij are i.i.d. type I
extreme value, the resulting choice probabilities for actor B have the logistic
distributions
p` =
eUB`
eUB` + eUBr
, (2.3)
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pr =
eUBr
eUB` + eUBr
. (2.4)
Actor A must account for actor B’s choices in order to calculate actor A’s
own utility. To do this, actor A conditions its own utilities by whether it expects
actor B to choose ` or r. That is, actor A must calculate its expected utility
and does so based on the observable portion of actor B’s utility and the known
distributions of αBj , which are the choice probabilities from (2.3) and (2.4). Actor
A’s utilities for selecting L and R are
U∗AL = UAL + αAL , (2.5)
U∗AR = UAR + αAR . (2.6)
Inserting the probability of each of actor B’s choices from (2.3) and (2.4) in order
to calculate the expected value for UAR in (2.6) yields:
EU∗AR = p`UAR` + prUARr + αAR . (2.7)
The resulting choice probabilities for actor A, from the analyst’s vantage,
are
pL =
eUAL
eUAL + eEUAR
, (2.8)
pR =
eEUAR
eUAL + eEUAR
. (2.9)
Equations (2.8) and (2.9) differ from a traditional logit model as they account for
the expected utility calculations of actor A, the endogeneity of strategic decision-
making from (bounded) rational actors.
The probabilities for each outcome Y1, Y2, and Y3 are simply the product of
the choice probabilities following the sequence of the game in Figure 2
pY1 = pL, (2.10)
pY2 = pRp`, (2.11)
pY3 = pRpr. (2.12)
These outcome probabilities are the equilibria outcomes of the game.
The observable utilities Uij can be specified as a set of regressors, such that
Uij = Xijβij . In order for the model to be identified, the same variable cannot be
specified for all j (Lewis and Schultz (2003)). The uncertainty introduced by each
actor action allows us to directly estimate the theoretical model using maximum
likelihood. Assuming there are data for each actor decision and regressors for
the utilities, parameters are recovered by maximizing the likelihood function
NIEMAN
L =
n∏
i=1
P(Y1,i = 1)
y1,iP(Y2,i = 1)
y2,iP(Y3,i = 1)
y3,i . (2.13)
3. A Strategic Model with Partial Observability
Data on actor decisions are frequently not available. In the absence of such
data, one often employs conventional binary choice models, such as a logistic
regression, using a first order βijXij specification. This specification ignores the
endogenous and conditional choices made by strategic actors. Even the use of
a mixture model, such as an endogenous switching or split-sample (e.g., zero-
inflated) logit (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh (2005); Greene (2010)), while helping
to account for the two distinct processes leading to outcomes coded as 0, fails to
model the strategic interaction depicted in Figure 2.
To address these data concerns, the likelihood in (2.13) can be re-written as
L =
n∏
i=1
P(Yi = 1)
yiP(Yi = 0)
1−yi , (3.1)
where
P(Yi = 1) = pRpr, (3.2)
P(Yi = 0) = 1− pR + pR(1− pr) = 1− pRpr. (3.3)
The likelihood captures the theorized strategic interaction between actors A and
B. The random variable Y = 1 when both actions R and r occur. Equation (3.2)
is the probability of observing Y = 1 in the data. The random variable Y = 0
when when either action L or actions R and ` occur. These events are pooled in
(3.3) and are separated probabilistically using the observed portion of the utility.
4. Monte Carlo Analysis
I analyze the ability of the strategic logistic model with partial observability
(SLPO) to recover parameter estimates using Monte Carlo simulations based on
a data generating process (DGP) that assumes a strategic interaction between
two actors, as shown in Figure 2. I compare the estimates to those from two other
models that are commonly used when estimating theorized strategic interactions
between (boundedly) rational actors: the split-sample logit (SSL) and the tradi-
tional logit. As the data are simulated and we know the actual parameter values,
I also estimate a full information strategic logit to assess the loss of efficiency
between the full information and partially observed models when data on actor
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actions are missing.
Assume the DGP
Ytrue =

Y1 if U
∗
AL
≥ U∗AR ,
Y2 if U
∗
AR
> U∗AL and U
∗
BR`
≥ U∗BRr ,
Y3 if U
∗
AR
> U∗AL and U
∗
BRr
> U∗BR`
where, from the perspective of actor A and the analyst,
U∗BR` = XB`βB` + αB` , (4.1)
U∗BRr = XBrβBr +XcβBrc + αBr , (4.2)
and from the perspective of the analyst,
U∗AL = XALβAL + αAL , (4.3)
U∗AR = p`XAR`βAR` + pr(XARrβARr +XcβARrc) + αAR , (4.4)
with p` = exp
(
U∗BR`
)
/
{
1 + exp
(
U∗BR`
)}
and pr = exp
(
U∗BRr
)
/
{
1 + exp
(
U∗BRr
)}
.
Consistent with random utility assumptions, I normalize βAR` = βB` = 0. I set
βAL = βARrβARrc = βBr = βBrc = 1. Fixed variables XAL , XARr , XBr , and Xc are
uniformally distributed [−2, 2]. The inclusion of Xc, a regressor that is common
to both actors, makes the simulations more realistic to applied research. The αij
are i.i.d. type I extreme value, and the resulting choice probabilities following
logistic distributions. I ran 1,000 simulations with 2,000 observations each. All
estimates were performed using Stata 14 statistical software.
I recoded the random variable Ytrue into a binary variable, to reflect the situ-
ation where data on individual actor actions are missing, and the data only report
whether actors A and B choose a specific joint outcome, but other outcomes are
not distinguishable, so
Ymiss =
{
1 if Ytrue = Y3,
0 otherwise.
Ymiss is treated as the random variable for each of the SLPO, SSL, and
traditional logit models. SLPO is specified consistent with the DGP and adheres
to the likelihood in (3.1).
SSL is a mixture model where the random variable is a function of two
processes, such that
P (Ymiss = 1) = SL, (4.5)
P (Ymiss = 0) = (1− S) + S(1− L), (4.6)
where S and L are logistic cumulative density functions. S is specified as S =
NIEMAN
exp (S∗)/{1 + exp (S∗)} where
S∗ = X ′ALβAL +XcβARrc + 1, (4.7)
and L is specified as L = exp (L∗)/{1 + exp (L∗)} where
L∗ = XARrβARr +XBrβBr +XcβBrc + 2, (4.8)
and the i follow logistic distributions. Equation (4.7) represents the “selection”
equation and (4.8) represents the traditional logit equation.
The traditional logit is specified as
Y ∗miss = X
′
ALβAL +XARrβARr +XBrβBr +XcβBrc + , (4.9)
where  follows a logistic distribution, and Ymiss = 1 if Y
∗
miss > 0 and 0 otherwise.
The full information strategic logit (FISL) used all of the data from the
DGP, treating Ytrue as the random variable. The FISL was estimated using the
likelihood in (2.13).
Figure 3 provides a visual display of the parameter estimates from the FISL
(thin solid line), SLPO (thick solid line), SSL (dashed line), and traditional
logit (dash dot line). Both of the strategic models are able to capture the true
parameter estimates, while the split-sample model is able to capture parameters
associated with actor B’s utility, but not those associated with actor A, and
the traditional logit produces only biased parameter estimates. The difference
between the strategic models and SSL reflects the conditional nature of actor
A’s actions, which SSL does not account for. As one would expect, when more
information is available, FISL produces more efficient estimates than SLPO, as
indicated by the taller densities.
Table 1 reports the estimated coefficients, standard errors, and root mean
squared error (RMSE) from the Monte Carlos. The strategic models are able
to approximate the true values for the parameters. SLPO recovers slightly less
biased estimates of the first stage coefficients than FISL, but is less efficient for
both first and second stage estimates in terms of RMSE. The slight conservative
bias associated with FISL stems from the greater precision of the second stage
estimates, which carries through the predicted probabilities that condition the
estimated coefficients in the first stage (Leeman (2014)). Comparing SLPO to
SSL, the former outperforms the latter, especially when estimating coefficients
associated with actor A, whose actions are conditioned by the expected actions of
actor B. SSL is able to recover unbiased estimates of coefficients associated with
actor B’s actions, but is less efficient than SLPO. The traditional logit recovers
biased estimates of all coefficients.
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Figure 3. Kernel densities of estimated coefficients.
I compare model fit statistics for the three binary choice models (SLPO,
SSL, logit) in Table 2. Since the models are non-nested in terms of their func-
tional form, I used Clarke’s distribution-free test and the Vuong test. Clarke’s
distribution-free test is informed by the median logged ratio of the likelihood for
the individual observations of two empirical models (Clarke (2007)). If the first
model is closer to the true specification, then the median logged ratio of the two
likelihoods is positive. If the second model is closer to the true specification, then
the ratio is negative. More formally,
H0 : Pr0
{
ln
f (Yi|Xi;β∗)
g (Yi|Zi; γ∗) > 0
}
= 0.5, (4.10)
where the numerator is the estimated model f that predicts Yi from a set of
covariates, Xi, and estimated parameters, β∗; the denominator is the estimated
model g, that predicts Yi from a set of covariates, Zi, and estimated parameters,
γ∗. The null hypothesis is that the median logged ratio of the likelihoods between
the two models is equal to 0. If di is set equal to lnf (Yi|Xi;β∗)− lng (Yi|Zi; γ∗),
the test statistic is
B =
n∑
i=1
I(0,+∞) (di), (4.11)
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Table 1. Comparison of estimated coefficient, standard error, and root mean squared
error.
Estimates FISL SLPO SSL Logit
βAL 0.942 0.966 0.679 0.329
SE 0.043 0.085 0.055 0.026
RMSE 0.218 0.305 0.399 0.691
βARr 0.885 1.002 0.353 0.275
SE 0.061 0.099 0.054 0.026
RMSE 0.279 0.330 0.688 0.742
βARrc 0.882 0.976 0.559 —
SE 0.062 0.105 0.059 —
RMSE 0.281 0.341 0.505 —
βBr 0.984 0.999 0.976 0.344
SE 0.064 0.079 0.094 0.027
RMSE 0.261 0.292 0.321 0.676
βBrc 1.041 1.054 0.963 0.578
SE 0.645 0.083 0.102 0.030
RMSE 0.265 0.304 0.337 0.456
Note: The RMSE =
√
Bias2 + Variance. Because the traditional probit
is a single equation model, it estimates only one parameter for Xc, which
is displayed with βBrc .
where I is a dichotomous indicator equal to 1 if ni > 0 in (4.10), and 0 if ni ≤ 0.
Equation (4.11) is the sum of positive differences and is a Binomial distribution
with n trials and a mean equal to 0.5.
The Vuong test compares the mean log-likelihood ratios of two models. If
the first model is closer to the true specification, then the mean log-likelihood
ratio is positive and statistically significant, similarly, the second model. As is
common practice, I use Schwarz’s correction to the Vuong test
LRn
(
θ˜n, γ˜n
)
−
{(p
2
)
lnn−
(q
2
)
lnn
}
, (4.12)
where LR is the log-likelihood ratio, θ˜ and γ˜ are the model estimates, and p and
q are the number of estimated parameters for model f and g, the two models
being compared (Vuong (1989)). I also assessed in-sample goodness of fit by
comparing correctly predicted and false positive rates across models.
Table 2 demonstrates that the various model fit statistics identify SLPO as
the best fit to the strategic DGP. Both the Clarke and the Vuong tests indicate
that SLPO reflects the DGP better than SSL and traditional logit; we can re-
ject the null hypothesis that either SSL or logit models are equal to SLPO, as
the p-value for each comparison is less than 0.001 using either test. SLPO is
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Table 2. Comparison of average model fit with a strategic data generating process.
SLPO SSL Logit
Clarke Test∑n
i llSLPO,i − llalternative,i > 0 — 1,191.254 1,622.903
Positive, 1-side test (p-value) — < 0.001 < 0.001
Negative, 1-side test (p-value) — > 0.999 > 0.999
Equal, 2-side test (p-value) — < 0.001 < 0.001
Vuong Test
Vuong — 94.595 374.007
SE — 1.385 1.120
t-statistic — 73.460 336.481
p-value — < 0.001 < 0.001
In-sample Predictions
% predicted Y1 (True = 44.7%) 45.5 52.1 —
% predicted Y2 (True = 24.5%) 23.4 16.1 —
% predicted Y3 (True = 30.8%) 31.0 31.8 50.5
% of Obs. Correctly Classified Ytrue 78.5 70.8 —
% of Obs. Correct Classified Ymiss 87.3 83.8 67.4
% of Obs. Correct if Yˆmiss = 1|Ymiss = 1 79.9 75.5 79.2
% False Positive (Yˆmiss = 1|Ymiss = 0) 9.3 12.4 37.8
% Correctly Predicted Unobserved (Yˆ2|Ytrue = Y2) 67.9 67.9 —
able to identify the true outcomes, an important consideration when calculating
predicted values. Both SLPO and SSL are able to correctly classify over 80% of
cases with binary outcomes, while logit correctly classifies less than 70% of such
cases. SLPO has a higher rate of correctly identifying cases where Ymiss = 1 than
SSL, and a lower rate of false positives. Logit is able to correctly identify cases
where Ymiss = 1 at approximately the same rate as SLPO, but it does so with a
higher rate of false positives. Both SLPO and SSL are able to correctly identify
separate the two types of 0 cases in Ymiss data.
These differences between SLPO, SSL, and traditional logit have ramifica-
tions when testing rational choice model using aggregated data that is missing
information about individual actor choices. Estimates using SSL are downward
biased on actions associated with actor A. The effect of this is that while in-
ferences related to the direction of an effect may be correct, any subsequent
substantive effects estimated from the model are not. Turning to the traditional
logit, it is unable to isolate the effects of Xc for each actor. On balance, SLPO
is the model best able to capture rational choice theories.
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5. Application
I apply SLPO to the example discussed in the introduction of firm compli-
ance with EPA regulations. In particular, I use data from Konisky and Teodoro
(2015) to explore the determinants of compliance with the Clean Air Act (CAA)
for 54,206 US firms during the period 2000–2011. Firms are coded as noncom-
pliant when they (1) violate the CAA and (2) are detected by the EPA (or state
regulators). Firms that either follow the standards set in the CAA, or that the
EPA fail to detect, are both coded the same in that they have not been found to
be noncompliant with environmental regulations.
Firms are expected to follow a “calculated motivation” (e.g., Winter and
May (2001); Konisky and Teodoro (2015)) in that they act as rational decision-
makers who comply with regulations if the net cost of doing so is less than the net
cost of noncompliance. The interaction of firms and regulators is strategic in that
firms are more likely to adhere to CAA standards when they expect regulators
to identify firms that violate the law, and are less likely to meet CAA standards
otherwise. Regulators, meanwhile, have limited budgets, and detecting violations
and issuing sanctions is costly. Regulators must therefor prioritize inspections
for some locations as the expense of others. The result of the firm–regulator
interaction is the same as that depicted in Figure 1, where firms are treated as
the first actor and the EPA (and state regulators) as the second actor.
The random variable, noncompliance, is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm
is officially sanctioned by the EPA or state regulators, and 0 otherwise. Approx-
imately 9% of observations are coded as noncompliant in the sample. I specify
a firm’s utility for the action to stay within CAA regulations (U∗F¬P ) with the
binary variable major air source, which captures firm size and is coded 1 if a
stationary source emits pollutants above a certain threshold (approximately 100
tons/year of air pollutants, 10 tons/year of a single hazardous air pollutant, or 25
tons/year of combined hazardous air pollutants). Given their more complex reg-
ulations, the parameter for major air source is expected to be negative. I include
several county-level demographic and economic characteristics to represent the
utility a firm receives from acting to run afoul of CAA regulations (U∗FP ). The
percent of the population that is African American or Hispanic are expected to
be associated with a reduction in a firm’s utility to comply with the CAA, higher
median household incomes should increase compliance, and higher poverty and
unemployment rates should decrease compliance. Finally, I control for whether
a firm was identified as a noncomplier in the previous year. The expected utility
for U∗FP , of course, accounts for the expected actions of the EPA.
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Table 3. Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Noncompliance 0.090 0.286 0 1 650,472
Major Air Source 0.305 0.460 0 1 650,472
Percent African American 11.905 14.062 0 86.489 650,472
Percent Hispanic 9.601 12.136 0.094 97.539 650,472
Poverty Rate 14.850 5.509 2.117 50.888 650,472
Unemployment Rate 6.117 2.612 1.1 29.700 650,472
Median Household Income 45,055.472 11,782.858 16,271 119,075 650,472
Public 0.050 0.217 0 1 650,472
Finally, I include several variables to capture the utility for regulators to
detect and sanction noncompliant firms (U∗ES). Public-sector firms can use polit-
ical back channels to pressure regulators and evade sanctions. Public is a binary
variable coded as 1 if a firm is publicly owned. I also include country-level de-
mographic and economic characteristics. Higher rates of minorities, poverty, and
unemployment are expected to be associated with lower probabilities of sanc-
tioning noncompliant firms, while higher median household incomes may lead to
higher probabilities of sanctioning noncompliant firms. Descriptive statistics of
each variable are reported in Table 3.
Table 4 presents the results from a SLPO and logit. I compare estimates
from the SLPO to a traditional logit model, as either logit or probit are typically
used in applied work with binary dependent variables. The models differ in
that logit treats the random variable as an additive function that combines the
theorized causal mechanisms attributed to a variable for each actor, while SLPO
models it as a strategic interaction and can isolate casual mechanisms attributed
to different actors by placing the same variable in multiple equations associated
with different actors.
The results between the two models differ in a number of ways. The logit
model identifies percent African American, percent Hispanic, and poverty rate as
statistically significant predictors of noncompliance, with the two former having
positive coefficients and the latter a negative coefficient. SLPO provides a more
nuanced interpretation: the increase in noncompliance associated with increases
in percent African American from the logit model is attributed to a lack of
deterrence, as the coefficient is negatively associated with the EPA’s utility for
sanctioning. Percent Hispanic has a positive coefficient in the equation for a
firm’s utility for polluting and a negative coefficient in the equation for the EPA’s
utility for sanctioning, i.e. increases in the percent of the Hispanic population
are associated with both an increase in the incentive of a firm to pollute and a
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Table 4. Comparison of logit and strategic logit with partial observability using data on
firm noncompliance with clean air act.
Traditional Logit SLPO
Firm (¬Pollute):
Major Air Source 0.807∗ Major Air Source −1.184∗
(0.012) (0.015)
Percent African American 0.001 Firm (Pollute):
(0.001) Percent African American 0.001
Percent Hispanic 0.004∗ (0.001)
(0.001) Percent Hispanic 0.009∗
Poverty Rate −0.020∗ (0.001)
(0.001) Poverty Rate −0.040∗
Unemployment Rate −0.003 (0.005)
(0.003) Unemployment Rate −0.004
Median Household Income −0.001 (0.005)
(0.001) Median Household Income −0.001
Public 0.011 (0.001)
(0.027) Lagged Noncompliance 8.617∗
Lagged Noncompliance 4.371∗ (0.244)
(0.013) Constant −4.152∗
Constant −3.423∗ (0.116)
(0.059) EPA (Sanction):
Percent African American −0.004∗
(0.001)
Percent Hispanic −0.007∗
(0.001)
Poverty Rate −0.022∗
(0.004)
Unemployment Rate 0.040∗
(0.004)
Median Household Income −0.001
(0.001)
Public 0.004
(0.035)
Constant 1.435∗
(0.100)
Observations 650,472 650,472
Log-Likelihood −111,859.60 −110,710.25
Note: *p < 0.001, two-tailed. Standard error in parentheses.
decrease in the deterring effect from EPA sanctions. The effect of poverty rate is
nonlinear, as the signs on the coefficients work in opposite directions. Increases
in the poverty rate decrease a firms utility for polluting, but they also decrease
the EPA’s utility to sanction. In addition to these variables, the logit model
identifies unemployment rate as statistically insignificant, while SLPO indicates
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Table 5. Model fit of logit and strategic logit with partial observability on firm noncom-
pliance estimates.
Clarke Test∑n
i llSLPO,i − llLogit,i > 0 603,207
Positive, 1-side test (p-value) < 0.001
Negative, 1-side test (p-value) > 0.999
Equal, 2-side test (p-value) < 0.001
Vuong Test
Vuong 1,189.531
SE 0.277
t-statistic 4,287.058
p-value < 0.001
In-sample Predictions
Logit SLPO
% of Obs. Correct 95.0 95.0
% of Obs. Correct if Y = 1 67.5 67.5
% False Positive 2.3 2.3
Pred. % Y2 (Pollute|¬Sanction) — 2.2
Note: Estimates from Table 4. SLPO is model 1 and logit model 2 in
Clarke and Vuong tests.
that it increases the EPA’s utility from sanctioning, exerting a deterring effect.
Table 5 reports model fit comparisons of the SLPO and logit models. One
sees that SLPO allows us to estimate the percent of observations in which firms
pollute but are not identified by regulators as noncompliant—predicted unob-
served Y2 outcomes—something that a traditional logit model cannot do. In
this case, the model indicates that 2.2% of observations fit into this category.
Since the probability of each outcome can be calculated for every observation,
this feature of SLPO has potential practical benefits to regulators and watchdog
organizations. In this specific case, the model indicates that in 1,253 of the ob-
servations, a firm has a probability greater than 30% of being non-compliant yet
avoiding sanctions.
The bottom of the table compares the fit of the two models to one another.
The Clarke and Vuong tests each offer strong support for SLPO over the logit
model. SLPO has a greater log-likelihood in over 90% of the individual observa-
tions, while the mean log-likelihood is also greater. On balance, the fit statistics
suggest that the strategic model is a better fit to the observed data than the logit
model.
6. Conclusion
Strategic interactions among actors are commonly theorized across the be-
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havioral, economic, and social sciences. Common approaches to empirically mod-
eling these interactions are made difficult in the presence of nonignorable missing
data on individual actor choices. I provide a solution to this problem by using a
strategic logit with partial observability that is able to capture the theorized un-
derlying strategic process in the presence of data on actor actions missing not at
random. I use Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate that the strategic logit
with partial observability outperforms other binary choice estimators, such as
traditional logit and split-sample logit. The Monte Carlo simulations show that
strategic logit with partial observability recovers the same parameter estimates,
and is only slight less efficient, as a full information strategic logit does with
complete information on individual actor choices.
I apply the estimator to the interaction of firms and regulators concerning
noncompliance with the Clean Air Act. Model fit statistics demonstrate the
strategic model better explains the observed data. The multiple equation nature
of the strategic model, moreover, is able to test specific causal mechanisms as they
pertain to each actor, something that traditional binary choice models cannot.
The estimator has numerous applications, such as criminal behavior, lending
practices by financial institutions, international and domestic conflict onset and
escalation, among others.
Supplementary Materials
Replication data and code are available at www.marknieman.net.
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